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Summary
Section I – Predatory Equity: Tenant Harassment as a
Business Model
• Neighborhoods around New York City saw a dramatic rise in harassment of tenants in recent years as landlords forced
out working families so they could raise the rent. This increase in harassment was driven by the rise of a new type of
buyer of New York City real estate: those raising money from W all Street-type investors who demanded profit levels
that could only be achieved in rent-regulated buildings by displacing tenants and undermining affordable rents. 
• Many of the lending institutions that provided huge loans for the purchase of these buildings packaged the
funds into mortgage-backed securities. This securitization was one of the core issue that led to the subprime cri-
sis, and has also encouraged a similar destabilization of decent multifamily housing by encouraging investors
to engage in very risky deals. Both the private-equity funders and the lending institutions were aware, or should
have been, that harassment and displacement of tenants was a necessary element in their financial model. 
• Private equity-backed developers, in the past four years, purchased an estimated 100,000 units of affordable,
rent-regulated housing. This is a almost 10 percent of New York City’s rent-regulated housing and represented
a major threat to affordable housing and stable communities. This overly aggressive private equity investment
has become known as “predatory equity” and has undermined the best efforts of New York City and State elect-
ed officials to slow the loss of affordable rental housing. 
Section II – The Default Crisis: Predatory Equity
Underwriting Unravels
• Although the harassment of tenants between  2005 and 2007 was highly effective in creating high tenant turnover and
quickly driving up building income, by 2008 intervention and education by community organizers had made tenants
more aware of their legal rights. As a result, although harassment has continued, it has been somewhat less effective.
At the same time, ANHD analysis suggests that much of the loan underwriting was so speculative and badly over-
leveraged that even aggressive tenant turnover could not have supported the mortgage debt the owners incurred.  
• This investment strategy has created a growing danger of default and poses a crisis for New York City apartment build-
ings. As of June 2009, 10 out of 10 predatory equity loans that ANHD is tracking are on a finance industry watchlist
for being in danger of default. These loans are far more likely to be on the default watchlist then nonpredatory equity
loans in the same mortgage-backed security pools, and could place up to 100,000 apartments at risk.  
• A primary indicator of default danger is the debt service coverage ratio. ANHD’s analysis of loan servicer reports
on mortgage-backed securities in which some predatory equity mortgages are held reveals that, as of December
2008, the average debt service coverage ratio of predatory equity financing is .55/1. This means that only 55 cent
in income is available for every dollar of debt owed. 
• This new commercial loan subprime crisis could have a destructive, destabilizing effect on tenants, affordable
housing and communities in New Y ork City because when an owner defaults on financing, the property often
falls into physical distress. These distressed buildings in turn depress the block in which they are located and
the neighborhoods where they are concentrated. This crisis may also have a destabilizing impact on local real
estate lending markets, reducing the availability of healthy investment in affordable housing. 
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• Responsibility for this crisis falls on many parties, including the developers and their private equity partners,
the bank lenders, the mortgage-backed security underwriters and the credit rating agencies. 
Section III – The Crisis Continued: Vulture Investors
and Banks Maintain the Speculative Investment Model
• As of the writing of this report, banks are aware that some form of deleveraging must take place. A number of
distressed-asset investment funds, better known as vulture funds, have been set up and capitalized specifical-
ly to take advantage of investment opportunities in New York City. These vulture funds are continuing the spec-
ulative investment model and, while they expect to be able to purchase properties and debt at less then their
current face value, they also expect to quickly raise building income and profits by pushing out existing tenants.
As of the writing of this report, there has been relatively little actual transfer of buildings or debt to the vulture
funds because banks are trying to establish the actual market value of the buildings and loans, being careful
not to sell for less than the assets might shortly be worth if the real estate market recovers. 
• There is cause for great concern because some properties that have been deleveraged demonstrate that, even
as debt is being reduced, a speculative investment model is being maintained. While the 2005-2008 model of
grossly overleveraging rent-regulated buildings may be on the wane, there is evidence that the crisis is being
continued by a new group of speculative investors who are less overleveraged, but are nonetheless using a
speculative investment model based on high tenant turnover and harassment. 
• One example is the Orbach Group, which recently purchased mortgage debt held by Deutsche Bank on a high-
ly overleveraged portfolio of buildings owned by the well-known predatory equity developer Pinnacle Group. The
Orbach Group has been accused of acting as a predatory equity-type developer in a portfolio of buildings it
owns in Manhattan, where local legal services providers have documented a pattern of harassment. 
Section IV – Policy Recommendations for Community
and Government Action
• Local policymakers must take an active role in defusing the impact of this crisis by pro-actively protecting the
rights of tenants in these buildings. They can use the legal tools at their disposal to stop tenant harassment,
monitor building conditions and owner financials, and commit resources to ensure that this hard-to-replace
affordable housing does not fall into abandonment and disrepair , dragging down tenants and communities. 
• Some strategies have already proven effective in countering the impact of predatory equity, including tenant education and
organizing that has slowed the impact of harassment, as well as public and legal pressure on the most abusive owners.
• It is also critical to close the legal loopholes that allow dramatic rent increases on vacant apartments, and so
provide the fuel for harassment and speculative financing. Legislation is currently pending in the State legisla-
ture to tighten the 1/40th rent increase loophole and to repeal vacancy de-control. Both steps are critical to
stopping the predatory equity model, and this legislation must be passed.
• There may be an opportunity created by the coming default crisis to transfer buildings away from defaulting
predatory owners to purchasers who will preserve the affordable housing. However , to achieve a significant
preservation purchase solution for the most at-risk properties, banks must be willing to move away from the
speculative model and reduce the sale price of the asset to its true income-based value. Strong government and
community pressure will be necessary to bring the banks to the table.
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Introduction
Jose Ricardo Aquaiza moved into his building in Woodside, Queens, in 1994. The neighborhood was a stable, mixed-
income community with a diverse ethnic mix and easy public transportation access to the major job centers of
Manhattan. Jose’s landlord was sometimes slow in providing repairs and services, but the rent was affordable, and over-
all the building and the community were a good, safe, stable place for Jose and his family. In 2006, a new owner named
Vantage Properties, backed by financing from Apollo Real Estate Advisors, a private equity fund, bought Jose’s building
in a deal that included 2,124 apartments in Northeast Queens. It was quickly apparent that the new owner and its
financing partners were operating with a new business model. Jose and many of his neighbors were immediately sued by
the landlord and faced eviction in housing court based on frivolous allegations.
In Jose’s case, the owner sued him three times in one year, once frivolously claiming that he had never been the legal
occupant of the apartment, and twice on baseless claims that he owed rent.  Jose was confident in asserting his rights
in housing court, and each time the landlord’s case quickly fell apart. But many of his neighbors were not so lucky. Most
were immigrants for whom English was not their first language. They did not have legal representation and the land-
lord’s aggressive attorney intimidated them into signing away the rights to their apartments. Within one year, almost 40
percent of Jose’s neighbors had been displaced from their apartments. 
With each vacancy, the new landlord made superficial improvements in the vacant apartment in order to take advan-
tage of a loophole in the rent regulation system that allowed him to quickly raise the rent (although very few repairs
were made to apartments occupied by tenants paying moderate rents). The landlord then moved in new tenants who
were able to pay the much higher rents. The building had been physically improved, but at the expense of Jose and his
neighbors, many of whom had been illegally bullied out. 
Jose may be confronting further trouble because his landlord is facing a financial crisis. When the loan was underwritten
in 2006, the owner and lender overleveraged the building using dangerous, speculative assumptions and financing tools.
As a result, by December 2008, the buildings had only 69 cents to pay every dollar of debt service owed, and the loan had
been placed on a default watchlist by the loan servicer. Jose’s building is caught between a rock and a hard place: the cur-
rent owner is harassing tenants because he bought the building with a speculative financing model, but, if the loan goes
into default, repairs and services will likely languish. Alternately, the bank may keep the speculative model going by rene-
gotiating the loan to keep the building in the hands of the current abusive landlord, or the bank may transfer the loan
and building to a new landlord at the highest possible price in order to continue the speculative model of investment. 
This exact scenario, based on a business model that has become known as predatory equity, is being acted out on a dra-
matic scale in dozens of neighborhoods around the city, threatening the stability of an estimated 100,000 affordable apart-
ments that make up a critical part of the supply of  affordable housing in New York’s stable, working-class neighborhoods. 
Section I – Predatory Equity: Tenant Harassment as a
Business Model
In recent years, neighborhoods around New York City have seen a dramatic rise in the harassment of tenants as land-
lords tried to illegally remove low- and moderate-income families so they could raise the rent. This increase in harass -
ment stemmed in large part from the rise of a new type of buyer of New Y ork City real estate. These new owners part-
nered with Wall Street-type investors to raise money from private equity funds that created a pressure for profit levels
that, in rent-regulated buildings, could only be achieved by illegally displacing tenants and undermining affordable rents. 
The private equity model of these new investors created an approach to and a model of building ownership that
was substantially different from the traditional real estate owner model:
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• Residential real estate in working-class neighborhoods of New Y ork City has typical-
ly been a financial backwater , a relatively non-liquid asset that returned a standard
profit of 7 percent to 8 percent a year . Profits are taken by owners as income, as
opposed to capital gains, and the non-liquid nature of the asset encourages the
owner to hang onto the building for the long term. There is relatively little pressure
and competition. 
• In contrast, residential real estate-based private equity investment funds bring a very
different set of pressures. A private equity fund attracts investors by proposing an
investment strategy that will offer a competitive rate of return, competing with other
Wall Street-type investment vehicles to attract and retain those investors. In the pri-
vate equity funds that we have examined, a 14 percent to 20 percent annual rate of return is commonly pro-
posed as the target profit level.  In residential real estate in working-class neighborhoods, the primary strategy
to increase the rate of return to such atypical levels is pushing out low-rent paying tenants. 
Private equity-backed developers have purchased an estimated 100,000 units of affordable, rent-regulated
housing in New York City over the past four years. This is a significant percentage – almost 10 percent – of our
rent-regulated housing and represents a major threat to affordable housing and stable communities. This
“predatory equity” is undermining the best attempts of New Y ork City and State elected officials to slow the
loss of affordable housing. 
Attached as an addendum to this report is a chart of major predatory equity deals around the city .  The commu-
nities targeted by predatory equity developers were generally stable, working-class neighborhoods where there
was a supply of affordable, rental housing, including:
• West Harlem, with developers such as The Pinnacle Group, V antage Properties and Stellar Management;
• East Harlem, with developers such as the Dawnay, Day Group;
• Washington Heights, with developers such as The Pinnacle Group, V antage Properties and Perseus 
Investment Group;
• Lower East Side, with developers such as Westbrook Partners;
• Manhattan’s Turtle Bay, with developers such as Tishman-Speyer;
• Grand Concourse Corridor of the Bronx, with developers such  as SG2 Properties;
• North-Central Bronx with developers such as Normandy Partners and Ocelot Group; 
• Sunnyside, with developers such as Vantage Properties;
• Corona, with developers such as Urban American and V antage Properties;
• Jamaica, with developers such as Vantage Properties;
• Ft. Greene, with developers such as the Dermot Group; and
• Many other working-class communities throughout New York City. 
Documenting the Harassment
The most common form of harassment included bringing repeated, baseless legal actions against the tenant in
Housing Court. In Housing Court, it is estimated that 90 percent of tenants do not have a lawyer , while 90 per-
cent of landlords have legal representation. T enants can thus be intimidated into signing away their rights with-
out cause or making a procedural error that costs them their apartment. This intimidation strategy relied on the
quantity, not quality, of legal actions filed. Research by community groups suggests that an aggressive landlord
who brings baseless legal actions against 10 tenants can expect four to sign away their rights. This strategy was
especially effective in buildings with an immigrant population. C ombined with denial of repairs and basic servic-
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es, aggressive buyout offers, threats to call the immigration authorities and numerous
other tactics, this strategy was very effective in forcing low- and moderate -income fam-
ilies out of their apartments. 
In early 2008, community advocates conducted door-to-door research in some of the
buildings where they suspected that systematic harassment was taking place.
Advocates looked for two indicators of harassment: 
• An “unnatural” tenant turnover rate under the new landlord that is in excess of
the 5.6 percent turnover rate that Housing and Vacancy Survey (HVS) data shows
is the expected annual turnover for apartments  renting for less than $800, which is
   an affordable rent for households earning $32,000. ”
• Specific experiences of harassment by current tenants, such as repeated baseless
legal actions, lack of repairs and services, and repeated aggressive buy-out offers. 
The results of the survey were striking in predatory equity-owned buildings across the
city. Some particularly egregious examples of harassment were documented in buildings owned by Vantage
Properties, a private equity developer backed by Apollo C apital and Credit Suisse. In the past few years, Vantage
and their private equity partners purchased over 9,500 units of affordable, rent-regulated housing in Queens,
Harlem and Upper Manhattan. Door-to-door surveys and other research found that Vantage engaged in a system-
atic pattern of harassment, primarily using the tactic of filing repeated, baseless cases in housing court.   
In one portfolio of its buildings in Queens, Vantage brought 965 separate court proceedings against 2,124 apart -
ments in the 16 months after it bought the building, suing almost one in every two tenants. This is a remarkable
number, especially compared to just 50 court proceedings brought by the prior owner in the year before he sold the
buildings to Vantage. In fact, Vantage filed so many eviction cases in Queens that it often monopolized one entire
courtroom in Queens Housing Court for its exclusive use. 
Door-to-door surveys of tenants living in Vantage buildings in Sunnyside, Queens, and Washington Heights,
Manhattan, showed: 
• In a typical Queens building, there was a 23 percent turnover rate in the one year after Vantage bought the port-
folio, driven by a Housing Court strategy employing baseless and frivolous cases to harass tenants; 
• In a typical Washington Heights building, 12 percent of the apartments were recaptured within nine months of
Vantage’s purchase of the building. Of the tenants who remained at the time the survey was conducted, 25 per-
cent were experiencing harassment, including 12 percent who were facing baseless and frivolous legal cases. 
Harassment strategies used by Vantage in one Queens building included:
• In the most common examples of harassment, tenants received notices canceling their leases, claiming that
they were illegally subletting their apartments, even though the tenants had lived in these apartments, and no
where else, for years;
• Other tenants were sued multiple times for unpaid rent despite having fully paid with money orders. Although
the tenants are able to prove in Housing Court that they have paid the rent in full, Vantage was often not
deterred and sued them again a few months later; 
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• Vantage falsely claimed that the tenants had never paid their original security deposits, even though most of
the tenants had been in the building for decades.  Vantage often used this claim to say that the tenants owed
back rent, giving Vantage an excuse to not cash any of the tenants’ current rent payments because they were
not “full payment.” Vantage then took the tenants to court for many months’ unpaid rent, even though the rent
was unpaid because Vantage itself had refused to cash the checks.
Tenants in Vantage-owned buildings filed a class action lawsuit in New Y ork State Supreme Court alleging illegal
harassment under Local Law 7 (Aguaiza v . Vantage Properties LLC, Index # 8105197/08) Although the case has
not yet been adjudicated, the judge hearing the case recently ruled that the acts alleged by the tenants constitut-
ed harassment and the case should go forward. 
Community advocates conducted similar door-to-door surveys and other research in
buildings owned by Normandy Partners in the Bronx; Westbrook Partners in the Lower
East Side; The Dermot Company in Ft. Greene, Brooklyn; the Dawnay Day Group in
East Harlem; and the Pinnacle Group in Harlem.  In each case, the surveys found an
extraordinary high rate of eviction, and specific strategies of harassment that were sim-
ilar to those used in the Vantage buildings. 
In March 2008, in part as a response to the epidemic of harassment, Mayor
Bloomberg signed Local Law 7,  “The Tenant Protection Act,” which gives tenants a
right of action to claim harassment in Housing C ourt when the landlord has engaged
in activities that cause or are intended to cause tenants to give up their legal rights or
vacate their apartments. The new law specifically includes bringing repeated, baseless
court proceedings and denying repairs and services as prohibited forms of harassment. 
This definition of illegal harassment has long existed in New York State law, but
prior to the passage of Local Law 7, tenants did not have a right to raise the issue in
Housing Court. 
Evidence of Harassment as a Business Model
The fact that this harassment is rooted in a systematic business model is made clear
in a prospectus filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) as part of a
mortgage-backed security offering for a group of buildings in Washington Heights that
Vantage Properties purchased in 2007. This deal, known as the Broadway Portfolio,
was financed by private equity partner Apollo Real Estate Advisors, and had a primary
mortgage from Column Financial (a subsidiary of Credit Suisse). In the prospectus, the underwriting terms state
that the owner would be able to pay the high debt-service costs because: 
“The sponsors plan to improve the subject’s performance by making capital improvements to individual units as the
leases expire and raising rents to market levels. The borrower anticipates to recapture approximately 20-30% of the
units [within the first year], and 10% a year thereafter
2
”
This is a clear statement of harassment because in rent-regulated buildings tenants have a right to renew their
leases, and rents on occupied apartments can only be raised by a limited amount. The rent on a vacant apart-
ment, however, can be increased dramatically. These 20 to 30 percent apartment recapture targets should
be unattainable because only 1 percent of the apartments in these buildings were vacant at the time the loan was
made, according to SEC documents, and the annual turnover rate for apartmentsrenting at less than $800 is only
 5.6 percent, according to HVS data obtained from the Rent Guidelines Board.
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Without an aggressive and explicit strategy of harassment to push tenants out, the numbers simply do not work.
The attached flow-chart Anatomy of a Deal illustrates the structure and problems of a typical predatory equity deal;
in this case, one involving Vantage/Apollo/Credit Suisse. 
These underwriting terms, and the systematic harassment they compel, were typical in financing and mortgages
of predatory equity deals. The principal mortgage loan was packaged into a mortgage-backed security for about
30 percent of the 100,000 private equity-backed units that advocates are tracking. ANHD analyzed the underwrit-
ing terms for each of the mortgage-backed securities, and two things are clear from our analysis of the loan under-
writing terms: 
1. These risky loans were underwritten outside industry standards, including  reliance on inflated income pro -
jections based on unnaturally high tenant turnover projections, use of  high-cost and short-term balloon financ-
ing, layered excessive mezzanine debt, overly aggressive appraisals, and understatement of the buildings’
maintenance and operating costs. (See Section II of this report for a full discussion of these issues). 
2. All of the term sheets specifically state or imply that, in order to be able to make the debt service payments,
the landlords would have to push out a significant percentage of the current regulated tenants so they could be
replaced with tenants paying higher rents.
Vantage was unusual in specifically stating their tenant turnover goal in plain English in their underwriting doc-
uments. But when ANHD examined the SEC-filed underwriting term sheets for 10 other major predatory equity
portfolio loans, we found clear indications of similar plans to force a high tenant turnover rate. In each case,
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Anatomy of a Deal
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mortgage loans were taken out with high debt beyond the buildings’ capacity to support those payments. The
underwriting terms for each loan explicitly projected a growth in rental income that would, over a few years,
quickly rise to meet the debt service costs. Given the predictability of increases under rent regulation, we were
able to analyze what the tenant turnover rate would have to be in order to meet the projected growth in rental
income. For example:
• The underwriting in a loan for the Riverton building in Harlem owned by Stellar management and Larry Gluck
assumed a 20 percent tenant turnover rate in the first year;
• The underwriting for the Esquire Portfolio of buildings in Washington Heights owned by Vantage assumed a 30
percent tenant turnover in the first year;
• The underwriting for Stuyvesant Town/Peter Cooper Village, owned by Tishman Speyer, assumed a 33  percent
tenant turnover rate;
• The underwriting for a portfolio of buildings in Upper Manhattan owned by the Pinnacle Group assumed a 30
percent tenant turnover rate. 
The Role of Mortgage-Backed Securities
One factor in the predatory equity model is resale by banks of the mortgages for the properties through invest -
ment instruments called mortgage-backed securities. This process is called securitization, and refers to the
process by which a mortgage lender sells a mortgage to an underwriter, usually an investment bank, that bundles
together a large group of mortgages and sells certificates in that group of mortgages to investors. Although
ANHD is focusing on the role of securitization in destabilizing New York City’s affordable rental housing, securi-
tization has recently become infamous because it lies at the heart of the current subprime lending crisis that is
costing so many small homeowners their homes and has driven the economy into recession. 
To understand how securitization works and why it led to the subprime crisis, take the small-home lender
Countrywide Financial as an example. C ountrywide (which nearly went bankrupt last year) was a major play -
er in the subprime mortgage market. As a lender , it was in its interest to make as many subprime loans as
possible because subprime loans are very profitable, paying the lender high fees up front. However ,
Countrywide’s desire to make highly profitable, but risky subprime loans should have been be tempered by
its fear of those loans going bad. No lender, not even Countrywide, wants to be holding nonpaying loans. But
through securitization, Countrywide worked with an investment bank to bundle the loans into an investment
security and sell certificates in that security to investors. This allowed Countrywide to immediately recoup the
value of the loan, while passing the risk that the loan would not be paid to the investor who bought the secu-
rity. In this way, securitization threw off the balance of greed and risk that should keep a lender from encour-
aging unstable and risky loans. 
The destruction created in the U.S.  and world economy by single-family residential subprime loans and the
investment instruments backed by those loans is now well understood. Lenders made expensive loans based
on unjustified assumptions or outright falsehoods about the borrowers’ ability to repay the loans. Borrowers
are now defaulting at a rate that threatens the future of countless families and communities. Lenders sold
those loans to back various investment instruments, including residential mortgage-backed securities and
other collateralized debt obligations, in order to raise more capital to lend and to hedge the risk of aggres -
sive lending. This has turned out to be a failure of historic proportions. Rather then hedging risk, the multi -
ple layers of mortgage-backed securities, collateralized debt obligations, credit default swaps and other com-
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plex financial instruments spread the risk around like a virus. When mortgage
default rates rose beyond analysts’ expectations, investors who bought any of the
multiple layers of the instruments lost billions and credit markets collapsed. 
In the case of private equity investment in New York’s multifamily rental housing, secu-
ritizing loans encouraged many financial institutions to do highly risky lending  that
was either predicated on harassment or financially unsupportable. This practice was
both destructive to the buildings and dangerous to investors who bought into the secu-
rities. 
Section II – The Default Crisis: 
Predatory Equity Underwriting Unravels
As with the single-family home residential subprime crisis, the speculative nature of
the multifamily building predatory equity investment model is proving highly unstable,
and a default crisis of predatory equity mortgages is poised to further undermine
affordable housing and communities throughout New York City. 
ANHD has analyzed the underwriting terms and actual performance of 10 major
predatory equity portfolio loans that were packaged into commercial mortgage-
backed securities. Because the loans were securitized, the borrower is required to report revenue, expenses and
vacancies to their loan servicer , and this information is tracked by the loan servicer against the underwriting
assumptions stated in the prospectus filed with the Securities and Exchange C ommission. The loan servicer
information is published in an industry data service called T repp.  Access to these T repp loan servicer reports
has allowed ANHD to determine whether a loan is performing and meeting its underwriting targets. The ser-
vicer reports also indicate if the servicer has placed the loan on a “default watchlist” because the underwriting
and performance of the loan indicates that it may be approaching default. 
The results of ANHD’s analysis are dramatic. We found that as of June 2009, a remarkable 10 out of 10 predato-
ry equity loans that we are closely tracking were either on a finance industry watchlist as in danger of default, in
workout with a finance industry loan servicer for being in danger of default, or actually in default. This compared
to a watchlist average of 20 percent of all other loans that were pooled in commercial mortgage-backed securi-
ties in the same year .
3
This makes predatory equity loans far more likely to be on a default watchlist than other
commercial loans in the same security pool. 
Another dramatic indicator of default danger is the debt service coverage ratio, the ratio of building income avail -
able to pay the debt owed on the building. Analysis by ANHD of loan servicer reports reveals that as of December
2008, the average debt service coverage ratio of predatory equity financing is .55/1. This means that only 55 cents
in income is available for every dollar of debt owed. 
ANHD only has access to detailed underwriting and servicer’s watch list information for the predatory equity
loans that were pooled into securities, covering 27,000 affordable rental units. A vailable loan information sug -
gests, however, that the financing model is similar among most of the 100,000 rental units that we classify as
having been purchased by predatory equity developers. 
This default crisis is likely to have a destructive, destabilizing effect on tenants, affordable housing and com-
munities in New Y ork City. When an owner defaults on financing, a property typically falls into physical dis-
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tress. These distressed projects in turn depress the block where they are located and the neighborhoods in
which they are concentrated. Another very real consequence of a default crisis is that local real estate lending
markets will be destabilized, with financial institutions unwilling to make the healthy investments that are nec-
essary in affordable rental housing. Investors in collateralized debt obligations will
also be affected if the default rate of predatory equity loans is high enough and if the
commercial mortgage-backed securities that they back are highly exposed. Although
this scenario has been disastrous in the subprime single-family home loan market,
it is not yet clear what will occur in the multifamily building loan market. 
The danger of default in these predatory equity loans was not an unforeseeable acci-
dent. As in the single-family home subprime crisis, these loans would not have
been made if long-accepted underwriting standards had not been ignored by a
chain of parties, including the developer , the private equity partner , the first loan
lender, the mezzanine debt lender, the security pool underwriter and the credit rat -
ing agency. 
ANHD examined the underwriting for 10 rent-stabilized multifamily residential
building portfolios, covering over 27,000 apartments, that were purchased by pri-
vate equity firms and financed with mortgages that were subsequently securitized
in commercial mortgage-backed securities. This underwriting information divulges financing terms and
underwriting assumptions that cannot be obtained from public records for non-securitized loans. These
securitized loans have many similarities: 
• Inflating Income Projections: Projected income was based on wildly aggressive tenant turnover assump -
tions, not actual income, and was used to justify inflated loan amounts. The growth in rental income from
a well-managed rent-regulated building should be expected to rise in a steady, but moderate line because
leases under rent regulation must be renewed and rents can only be increased by a moderate amount with
each lease renewal. Although dramatic increases in rent can be taken on vacant apartments, the average
annual turnover rate for tenants in affordable rent-regulated apartments averages 5.6 percent a year ,
which does not translate to the huge jump in rental income that speculative purchasers need to satisfy
their debt obligations. All the predatory equity mortgage underwriting that ANHD examined posits a sub-
stantial increase in operating income that will support repaying the interest on the project financing.  All
have substantial debt service reserves that are intended to cover the interest shortfall while the portfolio
is transitioned to a higher-income building with higher rents, as well as capital improvement reserves.  All
the owners state that they will achieve these higher rents by pushing a high tenant turnover rate in order
to raise rents through the Individual Apartment Improvement Program and Major C apital Improvement
Program.
• Relying on Balloon Short-Term Financing: None of the loans used to purchase these buildings amortize any of
the purchase price, and most have terms of five or seven years. Reliance on 100 percent non-amortizing debt,
while often seen in commercial and coop conversion loans, has not, until recently , been common practice in
residential loans. Non-amortizing debt supports inflated pricing of real estate.
• Using Mezzanine Debt: Mezzanine debt is unsecured, non-amortizing “subordinate” debt that has a higher
interest rate than the first position loan.   Hedge funds and private equity funds are typical lenders.  In almost
every deal analyzed, mezzanine debt was used as operating support to paper over the fact that the property
could not sustain its own costs, or to allow the developer to take out profits from nonperforming deals. 
The danger of default
in these predatory
equity loans 
was not an 
unforeseeable
accident.
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• Using Aggressive Appraisals: The appraised values presented in the underwriting information are often ques-
tionable.  Appraisers use a combination of comparable sales, replacement values and multiples of gross
income (Gross Rent Multiplier) to derive estimates of current market value.  In many of these loans, the Gross
Rent Multiplier is excessively high.
• Understating the costs of Maintaining and Operating Buildings. In many of the projects, reported or imputed
operating costs were deceptively low and bore little relation to the reality of operating multifamily rental hous-
ing in New York City.  
Analyzing the Default Risk of Specific Predatory Equity Deals
In the following Default Risk Summary Chart, ANHD analyzes five critical indicators of speculative underwriting
and financial distress for each of the 10 major portfolio loans:
1. Was the loan reasonable at underwriting?
a. What was the appraised value at sale of the building? Standard underwriting practice in New Y ork City
suggests that the value of the building should be no more then 10 times the building’s income. That
income is determined by the building’s rent roll, a number called the “gross rent multiplier .” A gross
rent multiplier of more then 10 indicates an overly frothy appraisal. 
b. What is the relationship between building income and building debt? In standard underwriting, there
should be at least one dollar in income for every dollar of debt owed. This relationship is called the
“debt service coverage ratio.” A debt service coverage ratio at underwriting of less then 1/1 indicates
that the loan was based on speculative assumptions. 
2. Were the underwriting assumptions honest? 
a. How did the building’s projected rental income when the loan was underwritten compare to the actual
rental income once the owner was actually managing the building? In many cases, the owner grossly over-
estimated income at underwriting, which can put enormous stress on the building’s finances and
place the loan in danger of default. 
b. How did the building’s projected operating expenses when the loan was underwritten compare to the oper-
ating expenses once the owner was actually managing the building? In many cases, the owner grossly
underestimated expenses at underwriting, which can put enormous stress on the building’s finances
and place the loan in danger of default. 
3. How is the loan currently performing according to the loan servicer? 
a. What is the actual debt service coverage ratio? Is it less then 1/1? For this critical metric, ANHD is com-
paring six-month loan servicer reports from June 2008 and December 2008 to show the trend of debt
service coverage ratio over a year. Astonishingly, the average debt service coverage ratio in June 2008
was .71/1, and in December 2008 was .55/1. That is, on average for these 10 portfolio loans, there was
55 cents in income available for every dollar of debt owed. 
a. Is the building on the loan servicer’s default watchlist? An astounding 10 out of 10 of these loans have
been placed on a default watchlist by the loan servicer, are in default workout with the loan servicer, or
are actually in default. Extrapolating from these 10 loans to the full universe of predatory equity build -
ings suggests that as many as 100,000 units of affordable rental housing bought by predatory equity
developers may be at risk of financial default. 
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Portfolio Information Queens MultifamilyPortfolio Savoy Park Broadway Portfolio Esquire Portfolio
Three Borough
Portfolio
Residential Dwelling Units 2,124 1,802 455 214 1,646
Neighborhood 11 submarkets ofQueens Harlem
Washington Heights
Manhattan
Hamilton Heights
Manhattan
Manhattan, Bronx &
Queens
Owner Vantage/Apollo Vantage/Apollo Vantage/Apollo Vantage/Apollo Westbrook, Nor-mandy, and others
Lender Column Financial Column Financial Column Financial Column Financial Barclays Capital
Underwriter Credit Suisse, etc. Credit Suisse, etc. Credit Suisse, etc. Credit Suisse, etc. Wachovia
Master Servicer Key Corp CapMark Key Corp KeyBank, Wachovia,and others Wachovia
Special Servicer LNR Partners, Inc. Midland ING Clarion Ptrs, LLC ING Clarion Ptrs, LLC LNR Partners, Inc.
I.  Was Loan Reasonable?
Appraised Value Per Dwelling
Unit $142,797 $233,074 $241,099 $196,729 $96,233 
Gross Rent Multiplier 13.05 24. 37 26. 72 19. 54 9.32 
Debt Service Coverage Ratio at
Purchase (Primary Mortgage
Only)
1.06 0.60 0.57 0.54 1.15
II. Were Underwriting
Assumptions Honest?
Underwritten Revenues (per
Dwelling Unit per Month) $825 $1,323 $1,741 $1,976 $910 
Last Reported Revenues (per
Dwelling Unit per Month) $989 $857 $1,049 $893 $0
Underwritten Expenses - total $9,020,053 $9,027,067 $3,388,038 $1,651,084 $7,489,818 
Underwritten Expenses (per
Dwelling Unit per Month) $354 $417 $621 $643 $379 
Last Reported Expenses (per
Dwelling Unit per Month) $629 $488 $678 $794 Not  available
III. Performance Report Data
Net Operating Income - 06/08 $23,653,849 $4,288,698 $1,589,953 $684,167 $10,068,950 
Debt Service Coverage Ratio
(Primary mortgage only) - 06/08 1.68 0.33 0.28 0.41 Not Available
Net Operating Income - 11/08 $8,185,160 7,528,260 $1,908,604 $1,813,632
Debt Service Coverage Ratio
(Primary mortgage only) - 11/08 0.69 0.57 0.43 0.11 0.66 (as of 06/09)
Loan Servicer Status Watchlisted - 11/08 Watchlisted - 04/08 Watchlisted - 10/08 Watchlisted - 07/08 Watchlisted – 02/09
IV. Reserve Status Trend Much worse Toward default, butstabilizing Toward default Toward default Probably OK
V. Time Remaining to Default
“BURN RATE”
Only 26% of Debt
Service Reserve
remaining, but likely
to stabilize
Debt Service Reserve
likely depleted.
Should default in
2009
13% of Debt Service
Reserve reported
remaining, but ANHD
analysis indicates it is
likely gone.  Should
default in 2009
35% of Debt Service
Reserve reported
remaining, but ANHD
analysis indicates it is
likely gone. Should
default in 2009.
Little information is
available
Predatory Equity Default Risk
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Portfolio Information RivertonApartments
Manhattan Apartment
Portfolio/Pinnacle
NYC Portfolio
Roll-up Dawney Day Mayberry
Peter Cooper Village
& Stuyvesant Town
Residential Dwelling Units 1,230 1,083 1,142 180 11,227
Neighborhood Harlem East Harlem East Harlem Upper East Side East Side
Owner Gluck & RockportGroup
Pinnacle /
Praedium Group Dawnay Day 
Atlas, Goldberger &
A. Cohen
Tishman Speyer,
Blackrock
Lender German American German American La Salle Column Financial Multiple
Underwriter Citigroup, etc. GE Cap Corp La Salle, MorgStan, and others Credit Suisse, etc. Multiple
Master Servicer Midland Key Corp Capmark Finance KeyBank/Wachovia,etc. Wachovia
Special Servicer CWCapital Asset LNR Partners, Inc. CenterlineServicing
ING Clarion Ptrs,
LLC
CW Capital Asst
Mgmt
I.  Was Loan Reasonable?
Appraised Value Per Dwelling
Unit $96,233 $142,797 $233,074 $241,099 $196,729 
Gross Rent Multiplier 19. 70 22.14 18.76 25.53 23.48
Debt Service Coverage Ratio at
Purchase (Primary Mortgage
Only)
0.39 0.42 N/A 0.50 0.58
II. Were Underwriting
Assumptions Honest?
Underwritten Revenues (per
Dwelling Unit per Month) $825 $1,323 $1,741 $1,976 $910 
Last Reported Revenues (per
Dwelling Unit per Month) $989 $857 $1,049 $893 $0
Underwritten Expenses - total $9,021,766 $6,489,037 $5,588,797 $2,767,091 $145,569,012 
Underwritten Expenses (per
Dwelling Unit per Month) $611 $499 $408 $1,281 $1,080 
Last Reported Expenses (per
Dwelling Unit per Month) $629 $488 $678 $794 N/A
III. Performance Report Data
Net Operating Income - 11/08 $3,846,361 $5,179,007 N/A $3,097,396 $106,024,910 
Debt Service Coverage Ratio
(Primary mortgage only) - 06/08 0.28 0.40 N/A 0.62 0.55
Net Operating Income - 11/08 4,031,421 N/A $10,009,575 $1,971,269 $132,413,333
Debt Service Coverage Ratio
(Primary mortgage only) - 11/08 0.29 0.35 0.87 0.39 0.67
Loan Servicer Status In Default Watchlisted - 12/07 Off Watchlist toSpec. Servicer
Off Watchlist to
Spec. Servicer Watchlisted - 04/08
IV. Reserve Status Trend
Little information,
likely heading
toward default
Getting worse Getting worse Toward default Restructuringahead
V. Time Remaining to Default
“BURN RATE”
Little information
reported. Rumored
near default
Collateral Reserve
balance almost
depleted. Should
default in 2009
Reserve balances
not reported.
Dawney Day has
folded. 
Reserve balance
not reported.
Stabilizing, but still
depleting reserves
at a rapid rate
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4. What is the status of the operating reserve and debt service reserve? 
a. Are the reserve funds being used up at a faster rate then expected? Because the underwriting assumptions
were so aggressive, these buildings took on large amounts of extra debt to act as a reserve fund for
operating expenses and debt service payments. But, that reserve is not unlimited. F or eight of the 10
loans, the reserve funds are being used up far too quickly . 
5. What is the “burn rate” of the debt and operating reserve? 
a. How much time is remaining before the reserves are fully used up and the loan is likely to go into default? 
One example of speculative underwriting assumptions based on tenant harassment and current financial distress
is The Manhattan Apartment Portfolio deal, which covers 1,083 apartments in Harlem and is owned by the devel-
oper The Pinnacle Group. This deal had private equity backing from The Praedium Group, a first mortgage loan
from German American Bank, and was pooled into a mortgage-backed security underwritten by GE C apital
Corporation. ANHD’s analysis reveals the following:
1. Was the Pinnacle loan reasonable at underwriting?
a. The appraised value of the buildings was based on a gross rent multiplier of 22.14, far in excess of the
industry standard of 10. 
b. At the moment the mortgage was underwritten, the debt service coverage ratio (the amount of build -
ing income available to pay debt service costs) was a dangerously low .42/1, although this number was
projected to rise as high tenant turnover enabled the owner to quickly raise rents. 
2. Were the underwriting assumptions for the Pinnacle loan honest? 
a. The buildings’ finances have performed far below what was projected at underwriting. A verage rents
were supposed to rise to $1,884 as thee buildings “transitioned” to market rate, but as of December
2008, average rents were only $948.
b. Operating costs were projected at $499 month per apartment, but as of December 2008, the average
per-apartment monthly operating cost was $599.
3. How is the Pinnacle loan currently performing according to the loan servicer? 
a. In June 2008, the loan servicer reported that the buildings had a debt service coverage ratio of .40/1.
That is, only 40 cents of income was available to pay every dollar of debt owed. By December 2008,
the debt service coverage ratio had fallen to .35/1.
b. The loan covering these buildings was placed on a default watchlist by the loan servicer in 
December 2008. 
4. What is the status of Pinnacle’s operating reserve and debt service reserve? 
a. Because of the above indicators, the debt service reserve and operating reserve are being used up at
a far faster rate then anticipated when the loan was underwritten. 
5. What is the “burn rate” of Pinnacle’s debt and operating reserve? 
a. The debt service and operating reserves are likely to be used up by the end of 2009, and the loan is
likely to go into default. 
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Stuyvesant Town and the Role of the Credit Rating Agencies
There is a long chain of responsibility for the predatory equity crisis, including the developer , the private equity
partner, the first loan lender, the mezzanine debt lender, and the security pool underwriter. One additional respon-
sible party stands out – the investment rating agency . The three major credit rating agencies – Standard and
Poor’s, Fitch, and Moody’s – play a central role in creating marketable investments by offering an “objective”
analysis of the credit worthiness of the investment. Most importantly, the credit rating agencies are supposed to
determine for investors whether the investment is “credit-grade” (rated on a scale from AAA to BBB), or “specu-
lative” (rated below BBB). The failure of the credit rating agencies to behave responsibly in the lead-up to the sin-
gle-family residential subprime crisis is now well understood. A recent, scathing report
by the Securities and Exchange Commission states, “The rating agencies’ performance
in rating these [residential subprime] structured finance products raises questions
about the accuracy of their credit ratings generally as well as the integrity of the ratings
process as a whole.”
4
We believe this assessment may be equally true for the commercial lending markets. A
prime example is the rating for the high-profile $5.4 billion deal for Stuyvesant T own-
Peter Cooper Village, an 11,000 unit housing complex on Manhattan’s East Side. The
finances for this deal were rated BBB- by Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s, declaring the
deal “investment-grade.”
ANHD analysis of the Stuyvesant T own-Peter Cooper Village deal suggests, however ,
that it was clearly speculative and based on unsustainable assumptions, including:
• The housing complex was assessed with a gross rent multiplier of 23.48, more then
double the underwriting standard gross rent multiplier of 10;
• The debt service coverage ratio at underwriting was .58/1, but this number was
planned to quickly rise to a more acceptable level as the new owner raised rents by
driving rapid tenant turnover in the lower-rent apartments;
• Owner Tishman-Speyer and their lenders projected at underwriting that approximately 3,000 rent-regulated
units would be deregulated within five years, a 33 percent  tenant turnover rate that could only be achieved using
illegal harassment;
• The complex has not performing as planned. Tishman-Speyer projected average rents of $3,576 as rents rose
to market level because of high tenant turnover; however , turnover and the market have lagged, and as of the
last loan servicer reporting, the average rents were only $2,058. Operating expanses for the building have also
been higher then projected. 
• In June 2008, the loans for Stuyvesant T own/Peter Cooper Village were placed on the default watchlist by the
loan servicer, primarily because the debt service coverage ratio had fallen to .55/1. In December 2008, the hous-
ing complex was kept on the watchlist by the loan servicer because the debt service coverage ratio had only
risen to .67/1, far less of a rise then needed to sustain the debt service payments. 
Few of these assumptions were realistic when the deal was underwritten, even in the most optimistic market con-
ditions, making the deal speculative and raising serious questions about the “investment grade” BBB-rating. 
Few of these
assumptions were
realistic when the deal
was underwritten,
even in the most
optimistic market
conditions, making the
deal speculative and
raising serious
questions about the
“investment grade”
BBB-rating. 
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The  finances of the deal are actually performing terribly, as should have been expected if the developer, lenders
and credit rating agencies involved had followed acceptable underwriting standards. A May 2009 research
report by Bank of America/Merrill Lynch analyzing the state of the financing for Stuyvesant T own/Peter Cooper
Village finds:
“As of April 27, 2009, the replacement reserve and debt service reserve was essentially depleted. The only
remaining reserve is the debt service reserve…The total reserve burn was faster during the last part of 2009 with
reserves paying down faster than $21 million a month. Even if we assume a debt service burn rate of $15 mil-
lion per month the reserve would be depleted by November 2009.
5
”
The other predatory equity deals we have examined do not have an individual rating for the loan (called a “shad-
ow rating”). Instead, only the loan pool as a whole is rated. In each case, the loan security pool was given an AAA
rating. Any danger to the investor in the security was expected to be hedged by various forms of “credit enhance-
ments” that are structured into the security pool. These credit enhancements included tranching and over-collat-
eralization. These same types of credit enhancements were expected to shield investors from losses in single-fam-
ily home loan-based investments, but failed when the loan default rate exceeded the levels that had been initially
projected by the rating agencies. The projected default rate of the predatory equity loans and the failure of the
agencies to accurately rate the Stuyvesant T own-Peter Cooper Village deal may well present a similar danger in
the multifamily building loan market, calling the role of the credit rating agencies into serious question.
Section III – The Crisis Continued: Vulture Investors
and Banks Maintain the Speculative Investment Model
The predatory equity model in New York City is now entering a new phase as banks decide how they will delever -
age these financially unsustainable deals. The banks will determine whether to continue the speculative model or
restructure the deals in a way that is healthy for affordable housing and communities. Unfortunately, there is rea-
son for concern. 
ANHD research of industry news sources suggests that, as of the writing of this report:
• Banks and mortgage-backed security underwriters are aware that they have grossly overleveraged predatory
equity deals, and that some form of de-leveraging must take place;
• A number of distressed-asset investment funds, better known as vulture funds, have been set up and capital-
ized specifically to take advantage of investment opportunities in New Y ork City multifamily housing as banks
sell off predatory equity debt and assets at a discount; 
• These vulture funds are continuing the speculative investment model, and while they expect to be able to pur-
chase properties and debt at less then their current face value, they also expect to quickly raise building income
to achieve unusually high profits by pushing out existing tenants. 
• There has been relatively little actual transfer of buildings or debt to vulture funds as of the writing of this report
because banks are trying to establish the actual market value of the buildings and loans, being careful not to
sell for less than the assets might shortly be worth if the real estate market recovers; 
• The banks may also have an incentive to favor restructuring the debt with the existing predatory equity owner
because the current market crisis may seem so bad that their best option is remain with the current building
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owner by extending the terms of the financing. The banks’ hope would be, as one analyst put it, to “gun the
engine and hope they can jump far enough to make it to the other side of the economic chasm:” 
• Another reason for the slowness of the deleveraging may be that T reasury Department policy is encouraging
banks to keep the loans on their books without restructuring the debt because holding on to distressed debt
allows the banks to maintain the appearance of value. Once the debt is sold or restructured, the bank’s books
must be adjusted down and investors and government regulators informed of the loss of value.  This same
problem seems to be responsible for slowing the rate at which banks are restructuring single-family home mort-
gages that are approaching default; 
• There is cause for great concern because some properties that have been deleveraged demonstrate that, even
as debt is being reduced, a speculative investment model is being continued. While the 2005-2008 model of
grossly overleveraging rent-regulated buildings may be on the wane, there is evidence that the crisis is being
continued by a new group of speculative investors who are less overleveraged, but are nonetheless using a
speculative investment model based on high tenant turnover and harassment. 
One example of this new speculative wave is the Orbach Group, which recently purchased debt held by Deutsche
Bank on a highly overleveraged portfolio of buildings owned by the well-known predatory equity developer The
Pinnacle Group. In this case, Deutsche Bank sold the loan to Orbach in a whole-note sale. E vidence gathered by
legal services attorneys working in a different portfolio of buildings owned by the Orbach Group suggests that
Orbach has a history of acting as a predatory equity developer , engaging in a campaign of harassment and dis-
placement in order to achieve high tenant turnover. 
In 2005, a partnership of the Praedium Group and The Pinnacle Group purchased a portfolio of 22 rent-regulat -
ed apartment buildings on West 109th Street totaling 384 units. In 2007, Deutsche Bank originated a $75 million
mortgage for the properties. Pinnacle is well known as a predatory equity investor, with a well-documented histo-
ry of harassing tenants by filing unsupportable legal papers, such as frivolous court cases, to press tenants, the
majority of whom are not represented by counsel, to give up the rights to their apartments. Reporting by the New
York Times in 2007 revealed that Pinnacle sued a remarkable 40 percent of the tenants within one year of purchas-
ing many of their properties.
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While we do not have performance data on the W est 109th Street portfolio loan because it is not a mortgage-
backed security , a different Pinnacle portfolio loan that is in a commercial mortgage-backed security (The
Manhattan Apartment Portfolio) is among the worst performers, with a Debt Service C overage Ratio of .35/1. 
In March, 2009, published reports suggested that Deutsche Bank planned a whole-note sale of the mortgage on
the West 109th Street Portfolio to the Orbach Group at a discount of 40 percent of the original value
7
. ANHD has
done an underwriting analysis of the West 109th Street portfolio and it is our assessment that a 40 percent dis -
count would leave the building far less overleveraged, although still somewhat in excess of the building’s actual
income-based value. This suggests that the lender , Deutsche Bank, now has a more realistic model of how rent-
regulated buildings in New York City should be underwritten. 
However, there are grave concerns about the Orbach Group as purchaser of the mortgage, as evidence suggests
that it has a history of managing buildings with the same speculative approach and harassing tactics as the worst
of the predatory equity developers. In 2008, the Orbach Group (also know as the Lighthouse Group) purchased
and began to manage 13 buildings in the Hell’s Kitchen neighborhood of Manhattan. Local tenant organizers and
legal service providers have documented that Orbach quickly moved to bring legal action in Housing C ourt
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against some 37 percent of the rent-regulated tenants. Legal services providers report
that many of these cases are frivolous, and clearly designed to intimidate tenants into
giving up the legal rights to their apartments. This pattern is consistent with the worst
behavior of predatory equity developers. 
Another deleveraging that indicates the risk of a continued speculative investment
model is a group of buildings in the Bronx owned by the Ocelot Group, with a first
mortgage from Deutsche Bank. The Ocelot Group defaulted on the debt and F annie
Mae, which had taken most of the debt from Deutsche Bank, was set to foreclose and
sell the buildings at auction. Tenant advocates from the Urban Homestead Assistance
Board together with the New Y ork Department of Housing Preservation and
Development (HPD) were aware that vulture investors were interested in the building
portfolio, even though the buildings suffered extremely severe distress because of lack
of maintenance. Pressure by advocates and HPD led to a positive outcome in this case,
and as of the writing of this report the buildings have been kept away from vulture
investors at open public auction. HPD is instead working with F annie Mae to pre-
approve a purchaser who will commit to preserving the affordability and physical condition of the buildings.
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While the 2005-2008 model of grossly overleveraging rent-regulated buildings may be on the wane, the Orbach
purchase indicates that a new model of speculative investment is taking its place. The debt load is lower , but the
owner has still purchased the building with an expectation that harassment of tenants, in clear violation of city
law, can produce a rapid turnover and outsized profit expectations.  If banks continue to deleverage unsupport-
able predatory equity loans by selling to the highest purchaser, even if that purchaser has a destructive and spec-
ulative model, instead of reducing the price of the asset to its true income-based value and selling to a stable,
preservation purchaser, affordable housing and communities will continue to suffer . 
Section IV – Policy Recommendations for 
Community and Government Action
This paper suggests that tenants and communities around New York City face a serious crisis stemming from
the scale of the predatory equity model and the pending default crisis.  New protections and strategies must
be put in place to safeguard the tenants, affordable housing, communities and investors who may be dam-
aged. Over the past two years, tenants, community organizers and government officials have developed some
strategies that have been successful in countering the destructive impact of predatory equity on tenants and
affordable housing:
• Tenant education and organizing by ANHD member groups and others has had a positive impact by giving ten-
ants information and tools to dampen the effectiveness of harassment and slow the rate of tenant displace -
ment.
• Public pressure and legal action has sometimes helped discourage predatory equity owners from engaging in
the worst behavior.
• In one important example, concerted pressure by government and community groups successfully encouraged
a bank to agree to sell a distressed predatory equity portfolio owned by the Ocelot Group to a preservation pur-
chaser. In this case the holder of the debt, F annie Mae, is a government-sponsored entity that was more sus-
ceptible to pressure than an ordinary bank to value the public benefit over their balance sheet in their actions. 
There must be a 
pro-active, strategic
local government
response to this grow-
ing crisis that antici-
pates where the prob-
lems will occur and
develops the resources
and policy tools to deal
with the crisis.
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There is no silver bullet for the problems that distressed predatory equity deals will cause and no single govern-
mental agency can be responsible for the solution. But there must be a pro-active, strategic local government
response to this growing crisis that anticipates where the problems will occur and develops the resources and
policy tools to deal with the crisis. 
Steps to address the predatory equity harassment and default crisis include:
Enforce Existing Tenant Protections in Strategically Targeted At-Risk Buildings:  
• Educate and Support At-Risk Tenants. Predatory equity investments are based on the assumption that tenants
can be pushed out and rents increased beyond historically reasonable levels, using illegal harassment as the
means. The first line of defense must be assisting tenants to understand their rights so they can stay in their
homes. Resources must be committed so that community groups can pro-actively reach out to buildings and
educate tenants to protect their rights in buildings targeted by a predatory equity investment strategy;    
• Focus Anti-Harassment Enforcement in At-Risk Buildings. Anti-harassment protections for tenants, includ-
ing the recently signed T enant Protection Act (Local Law 7) and state anti-harassment provisions in the
Rent Stabilization C ode, must be energetically enforced by city and state agencies. The New Y ork City
Department of Housing Preservation and Development (HPD) must commit anti-harassment enforcement
resources from their litigation unit to pro-actively target predatory equity buildings where the risk of harass-
ment is greatest;
• Focus Code Enforcement in Affected Buildings. As buildings with a predatory equity investment strategy begin
to face increasing financial pressure, as this white paper suggests they will, tenants will likely face deteriorat -
ing conditions as the building owner tries to save money by reducing necessary repairs and services, or as the
building is neglected while ownership is in doubt. HPD must commit code enforcement resources, including
inspections, litigation and emergency repairs, to help avoid building deterioration. HPD should pro-actively
target these buildings before the crisis becomes more severe.
Tighten the 1/40th Rent Increase Loophole that is Central to the Predatory Equity Model: 
The specific mechanism that developers use to raise rents on vacant, rent-regulated apartments after the ten -
ant has been moved out is an Individual Apartment Improvement Increase, also known as a 1/40th increase.
Under this rule, a landlord is allowed to raise the monthly rent on a vacant apartment by 1/40th of total cost of
any improvement made to that apartment, but the loophole is often subject to fraud because it relies entirely
on landlord self-certification with no government oversight. This leaves tenants vulnerable and the rules virtu -
ally unenforced. The loophole’s formula is also excessively generous: instead of providing a reasonable incen -
tive for owners to invest and make improvements, the loophole offers owners a quick and cheap path to take
the apartment out of affordability . The New Y ork State Assembly has already passed legislation to tighten the
1/40th loophole and the bill is awaiting action by the State Senate and governor .
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Repeal Vacancy De-Control: 
The ability of developers to remove apartments from rent regulation when they raise the rent on a vacant apart-
ment to above a $2,000 threshold (vacancy de-control) has been an enormous incentive for illegal harass -
ment, and a central part of the predatory equity financing model. Often combined with a 1/40th rent increase
as the actual mechanism to raise the rent above the threshold, vacancy de-control has allowed a speculative
financing model to run amuck and fueled the loss of thousands of units of affordable rental housing.
Legislation to repeal vacancy de-control has been passed by the New Y ork State Assembly , and is awaiting
action by the State Senate and governor.
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Create a Preservation Purchase Solution for Buildings at Risk of Default 
Many of the multifamily buildings bought by predatory equity developers will fall into financial distress. This will have
destructive, destabilizing effect on tenants, affordable housing, and communities in New York City because when an
owner defaults on financing, a property very often falls into physical distress, and these distressed projects, in turn,
depress the neighborhoods where they are concentrated. V ulture investors may also purchase distressed predatory
equity buildings with an explicit strategy of continuing the speculative ownership model, with the harassment that
implies, at the expense of tenants rights and affordable housing.  Because of these threats, city and state authorities
must develop a plan and commit resources to protect this hard-to-replace affordable housing. 
A true solution to the crisis must include a public/private strategy to deleverage and preserve affordability by
restructuring the building and transferring it to a preservation purchaser . There are a relatively small number of
banks and financial institutions that hold the first-position loans, either through origination or underwriting the
mortgage-backed security, on the majority of predatory equity buildings that are in danger of default. With politi-
cal pressure and limited public financing or access to tax abatements, the buildings could be transferred to a
preservation purchaser.
There will be no preservation purchase solution at the scale necessary to stabilize our neighborhoods unless the
banks are willing to move away from a speculative model and adjust the value of the building and debt down to
its true income-based value.  If, for example, the bank writes down a loan to 80 cents on the dollar, but the rental
income only supports debt at 50 cents on the dollar , the building may continue to deteriorate, with tenants still
likely to face harassment or displacement. At that same 80 cents on the dollar, any purchaser will likely employ a
speculative ownership model, with all the tenant harassment that implies. 
The deleveraging of these building loans and investments will be complicated and unlikely to happen in a uni -
form manner. The bank that originated the first-position loan may be in the best position to negotiate, given its
numerous leverage points. That bank can restructure the loan so the current owner can afford the debt service
payments, initiate a foreclosure proceeding on the loan, or write down the value of the loan to an amount that is
more sustainable and sell it to a new buyer. That bank can also negotiate to reduce the value of the loan and trans-
fer it to a new owner. Mezzanine lenders, in general, are in a junior position in the debt stack and cannot force a
transfer of the building or primary debt. 
Securitized loans can also be included in this process because the underwriter of a commercial mortgage-backed
security generally retains the right to foreclose on or renegotiate the loans. The specific entity that is given acting
authority over the mortgage is generally the special servicer, but the holder of a particular portion of the security
known as the equity tranch controls the special servicer . Generally, the underwriting institution holds the equity
tranch of the security. The specifics of these relationships are complex and vary in each security . (In this respect,
commercial mortgage-backed securities based on multifamily building loans are different then residential mort-
gage-backed securities based on single-family home mortgages, which are made of an enormous number of loans
and where the underwriter may not have immediate control to restructure the debt of any of the mortgage assets
in the security.)
A pro-active strategy that seeks deleveraging and transfer of ownership to a preservation purchaser should fea -
ture the following:
• Political and community organizing pressure that is applied on those limited number of banks and financial
institutions that hold defaulting predatory equity loans, bringing them to the table before the building has been
transferred to vulture investors or the loan inadequately restructured with the current owner .
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• Financing tools that can facilitate quick action by preservation-minded financiers and purchasers.
• The development of a pre-approved list of preservation purchasers, including both for-profit and nonprofit
groups. 
This strategy should engage each bank or underwriter on an institution-by-institution basis. The strategy must
move quickly because it relies on the premise that, because of market conditions, the financial institutions are
already expecting to take significant write-downs on many loans, and may therefore be open to taking a slightly
deeper loss in return for political gain. 
Because bank have, as discussed in Section III, been slow to deleverage the assets and resistant to pressure to
consider the impact on the local community in their restructuring of the debt, it is necessary to develop addition-
al tools and strategies to achieve a preservation purchase solution for a meaningful number of at-risk buildings.
Some possible new tools include:
• Federal TARP, TARP for Main Street, or Public Private Investment Program funds could be used to provide
resources for preservation purchases, or used to purchase predatory equity assets in distressed mortgage-
backed securities, with the requirement that the financing require the preservation of the affordable housing
and tenants’ rights. 
• Bank supervision under the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) could encourage banks to transfer distressed
predatory equity assets to preservation purchasers in return for CRA credit. 
• A report from the Citizens Housing and Planning C ommission proposes that banks could be encouraged to
consider preservation transfers of predatory equity assets with the following approach: HPD and HUD could
create a list of pre-approved buyers who could then purchase the debt of distressed predatory equity assets for
the fair market value, with that value based on current building income and expenses. In order to protect the
bank against too great a loss on their balance sheet, an agency such as the the F ederal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC) could issue a subordinate note for the difference between the fair market value and the
book value of the debt. The bank could then write-down the debt over a 10-year period, in that way reducing the
impact of the loss on the bank’s balance sheet.
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• The Citizens Housing and Planning Commission also proposes changes to New York State foreclosure law that
would give a greater ability to protect at-risk predatory equity buildings. These changes include: giving HPD the
exclusive right to select receivers (court-appointed managers) for large multifamily buildings in foreclosure,
limiting bidders on foreclosed large multifamily buildings to those pre-approved by HPD; and, giving HPD the
right to intervene in foreclosure proceedings to monitor building conditions.
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While the damage done to the city’s affordable housing stock by speculative and predatory lending cannot be
undone in some cases, the current decline in market values may allow coordinated intervention and delever-
aging to preserve affordability of defaulting predatory equity buildings, with only a very moderate infusion of
public resources. 
Stronger Regulation of Credit Rating Agencies: 
New regulations and oversight must be developed for the credit rating agencies. This new oversight can include
more explicit SEC standards or legal action by state law enforcement authorities such as the attorney general to
hold the credit rating agencies accountable. 
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Appendix A
Resources for Combating Predatory Equity
Citywide Policy and Tenant Organizing Support Groups
Association for Neighborhood and Housing Development
212-747-1117   www.anhd.org
Urban Homestead Assistance Board
212-479-3302   www.uhab.org
New York State Tenants and Neighbors
212-608-4320   www.tandn.org
Community Service Society
212-614-5483   www.cssny.org
Citizens Housing and Policy Council 
212-286-9214   www.chpcny.org
Neighborhood-Based Tenant Organizing Support Organizations
Lower East Side:
Good Old Lower East Side
212-533-2541   www.goles.org
Cooper Square Committee
212-228-8210   www.coopersquare.org
Upper West Side:
Goddard Riverside Community Center SRO Law Project
212-873-6600   www.goddard.org/srolawproject
Washington Heights:
Mirabal Sisters Community Center
212-234-3002   www.mirabalcenter.org
Northern Manhattan Improvement Corp. 
212-822-8300   www.nmic.org
Bronx:
New Settlement Apartments
718-716-8000
North West Bronx Community and Clergy Committee
718-584-0515   www.northwestbronx.org
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Queens:
Queens Vantage Tenants Council c/o Catholic Migration Services
347-472-3500
Immigrant Tenant Advocacy Project, Catholic Migration Services
347-472-3500
Chhaya Community Development Corp.
718-478-3848   www.chhayacdc.org
Make the Road New York
718-418-7690   www.maketheroad.org
Woodside on the Move
718-476-8449   www.woodsideonthemove.org
Queens Community House
718-592-5757   www.queenscommunityhouse.org
Centro Hispano Cuzcatlan
718-298-5083   www.chcuzcatlan.org
Brooklyn:
Pratt Area Community Council
718-522-2613   www.prattarea.org
Fifth Avenue Committee
718-237-2017   www.fifthave.org
Flatbush Development Corp. 
718-859-4897   www.fdconline.org
Make the Road New York
718-418-7690   www.maketheroad.org
Cypress Hills Local Development Corporation
718-647-2800   www.cypresshills.org
Appendix B
Chart of Major Predatory Equity Deals (non-comprehensive)
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Developer Portfolio Name Neighborhood(s)
Vantage
Broadway Portfolio
Queens Portfolio I - Katz
Queens Portfolio II - Haros
Aries Portfolio
Amsterdam Apartments
Savoy Park/Delano
Esquire Portfolio
Saxon Hall
Washington Heights
Flushing, Sunnyside, Rego Park
Jackson Heights, Astoria, Kew Gardens
Woodhaven, Hollis, Woodside, Elmhurst
Sunnyside, Jackson Heights, Corona
Harlem
Hamilton Heights 
Rego Park
Pinnacle
Manhattan Apartment Portfolio
Various Large Portfolios
Washington Heights, Harlem
Washington Heights, Harlem, Brooklyn
Normandy Partners
Three Borough Pool
East Villiage Portfolio
Bronx, Wash. Heights, Harlem, Sunnyside
East Villiage
Westbrook Partners
East Village East Villiage
Dawnay, Day Group
New York City Apt. Portfolio El Barrio
SG2
Various Bronx, Wash. Heights
Prana Growth Fund
Variou Washington Heights, Bronx
Dermot
Various Brooklyn, Astoria
Taconic Investment
Eastchester Heights
Farfield Towers
Bronx
Brooklyn
Cronus Capital
Upper Manhattan Upper Manhattan, Harlem
Urban American
Eastchester Heights
Tennis Court
Prospect Park South/Flatbush
Fordham/Manhattan
Kinsbridge, University Heights
5 Large Complexes
Brooklyn
Brooklyn
Bronx, Manhattan
Bronx, Manhattan
Various
Ocelot Holdings
Various Bronx, Northern Manhattan
Atlas Capital Group
Mayberry House Upper East Side
Bronstein Properties
Bassuk Portfolio Brooklyn, Queens
Northbrook Partners
Various West Village, Upper West Side
Tahl-Propp Equities
Various Harlem
Tishman-Speyer
Peter Cooper/Stuyvesant Town Manhattan
Cammeby’s International
Various Brooklyn, Various
Stellar Management
Rivington, Various Harlem, Various
Tahl-Propp
Various Harlem, Various
Karasick
Robert Fulton Terrace, various Harlem, Various
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Equity Partner First Loan CMBS Underwriter
Apollo
Apollo
Apollo
Apollo
Apollo
Apollo
Apollo
Apollo
Column/Credit Suisse
Column
Prudential
Column
Column
Column
Column
Prudential
Credit Suisse
Credit Suisse
Credit Suisse
Credit Suisse
Praedium Capital
Praedium Capital
Column
Column
GE Commercial Mortgage Corp 
Vantage - Westbrook Barclays Wachovia
Westbrook Barclays
Dawnay, Day Lasalle Morgan Stanley Capital I
BlackRock Realty Morgan Stanley
Canyon/Johnson Funds NY Community Bank
ING Clarion
Apollo
Perseus Capital WaMu
City Investment Fund
RCG Urban American/
Ramius Capital Group
Ocelot Capital Deutchebank
Lehman Brothers Credit Suisse
JP Morgan Investment Management
Blackrock
Blackrock, Various Pari Pasou Wachovia, Cobalt, Merrill Lynch
Various
Apollo, various Royal Bank of Canada
JP Morgan Chase
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The Association for Neighborhood and Housing Development
The Association for Neighborhood and Housing Development (ANHD) is a membership organization
of New Y ork City not-for-profit neighborhood housing groups. Our mission is to ensure flourishing
neighborhoods and decent, affordable housing for all New Yorkers. We pursue this mission by supporting
the programs and advancing the priorities of our member organizations engaged in community
development and community organizing is low- and moderate-income neighborhoods throughout the city.
We have 98 member organizations composed of CDCs, community organizing groups and supportive
housing providers. Our members have successfully rebuilt blighted neighborhoods and have preserved
poor and working-class communities as safe and decent places to live. The New Y ork City not-for-profit
housing sector has developed over 100,000 units of low-and moderate-income housing; the ANHD
membership directly operates over 35,000 units, providing housing for over 100,000 people. In addition
to housing programs, our membership has also sponsored exciting and innovative commercial
revitalization projects, engaged in workforce development initiatives and obtained substantial
improvements in quality of life in the areas of public safety, education, child care, and open spaces for
the neighborhood people they serve. 
Visit www.anhd.org for more information about ANHD and our Permanent Affordability campaign. 
